Abstract-Conventional remote password authentication schemes allow a serviceable server to authenticate the legitimacy of a remote login user. However, these schemes are not used for multiserver architecture environments. In this paper, we present a remote password authentication scheme for multiserver environments. The password authentication system is a pattern classification system based on an artificial neural network. In this scheme, the users only remember user identity and password numbers to log in to various servers. Users can freely choose their password. Furthermore, the system is not required to maintain a verification table and can withstand the replay attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
R ECENTLY, computer security has become an important issue. More and more systems have added control to the access process for avoiding illegitimate users reading sensitive information. Password authentication is one of the mechanisms that is widely used to authenticate a legitimate user. Conventional password authentication schemes are suited to solve the privacy and security problem for single servers under a client/server architecture. However, the use of computer networks and information technology has grown spectacularly. Many network architectures have become multiserver environments. In conventional password authentication schemes, a network user not only needs to log into various remote servers with repetitive registration, but also needs to remember the various user identities and passwords. Another problem in using the traditional password authentication method is that a server must maintain a password table that stores each user's ID and password. Therefore, the server requires extra memory space to store the password table. The table is shown in Fig. 1(a) [10] . When a user logs into a computer, he/she types in the ID and password. The server searches the password table and checks if the password is legal. However, this method is dangerous. The password information table could be read or altered by an intruder. An intruder can also append a new ID and password into the table.
In order to avoid the security problem, some password authentication schemes have proposed as in [9] , [10] , [15] - [17] , [19] , [27] , and [29] . In their schemes, verification table is used to replace password table. The verification table is shown in Fig. 1(b) . These schemes often uses the techniques of one way hash function or encryption algorithm to encode the password and stores the value of on the table to solve the security problem. However, the server must maintain and protect the table from being modified by an intruder.
In this paper, we propose an efficient remote password authentication scheme based on a neural network. This system identifies the legitimate user in real time using a pattern classification technique and is applicable to a multiserver network architecture. In this classification system, the input pattern is the user password and the output is the serviceable servers. Before describing the proposed scheme, we shall briefly review the related works on remote password authentication schemes. It is worthwhile to notice that the reviewed schemes have already solved the problems of remote password authentication in a single-server network architecture. However, these reviewed schemes are not applicable to a multiserver network architecture. Following this review, our proposed scheme is presented. The experimental results and the selection of an applicable structure for the neural network are discussed thereafter. Finally, our conclusions are presented in the last section of this paper.
1045-9227/01$10.00 © 2001 IEEE II. RELATED WORKS In this section, related works in the area of remote password authentication schemes are introduced. A typical remote password authentication system consists of two kinds of participants, a remote user and a serviceable server. The server authenticates the password of the login user and provides service for a legitimate login user. Typically, a remote password authentication protocol consists of three phases: 1) registration phase; 2) login phase; and 3) server authentication phase. A new user must register with the server first. After registration and authorization, the user can login to the server and obtain service.
The first password authentication scheme concept based on the one-way hash function was proposed in [9] , [15] , [17] , [19] , and [29] . This system used a verification table to verify the validity of a login user. An intruder could modify the verification table stored in this computer system. In 1982, Denning [6] proposed a password scheme based on a signature scheme. This scheme, however, also required a verification table. These schemes cannot withstand the replay attack.
In 1990, the password authentication scheme based on a neural network was initially proposed. The related works [3] , [22] , [23] proposed an effective pattern recognition techniques for identifying users. The user types his password and the time interval between each character stroke is collected. The intercharacter time is treated as an input vector. Using the neural network to classify a particular user, latter, Anagun and Cin [1] proposed a scheme for a multiple user environment. In their scheme, the input vector is collected in a manner similar to the above method. The system presents each user with a password of different lengths.
Recently, new remote password authentication schemes [4] , [11] - [14] , [28] , [30] that can withstand the replay attack and permit users to choose and change their passwords freely have been proposed. However, these schemes are not adaptable to multiserver environments. It is inefficient to login various remote servers with repetitive registration and retain numerous user IDs and passwords. To amend these problems, we propose a new authentication scheme that uses a neural network and no verification table for password authentication in a multiple server system.
III. A NEW AUTHENTICATION SCHEME USING NEURAL NETWORKS
In this section, we propose a remote password authentication scheme that utilizes a neural network. This scheme is designed for a multiserver environment. In the password authentication process, there are three participants: the login users, the various servers, and a system administrator (SA). In our scheme, each legitimate user holds only a user identity and its corresponding password. The system administrator recognizes a user through the neural network. The neural network is trained and the weights are stored in each server. The process can be divided into three phases: 1) the registration phase; 2) the login phase; and 3) the authentication phase. Before logging in to a server, a new user must register some information first to become a legitimate user. The registration phase only performed once. Each legitimate obtains a valid user identity and password. Later, the user types his identity and password to login to any one of the servers. In the authentication phase, the servers validate the legitimacy of the remote login user.
In the remainder of this paper, stands for users and stand for the various servers.
and stand for the user identity and password of . Initially, SA chooses a large public and , where is a large prime and is a primitive integer number in Galois field GF .
define the DES-like encryption/decryption function using a 56-bits secret key , where DES-like is a symmetrical data encryption standard. It encrypts plaintext in 64 bits and outputs the ciphertext in 64 bits. For more details about the DES-like algorithm, refer to [18] , [25] . In the following, the proposed remote password authentication scheme for a multiserver architecture is described.
A. The Registration Phase
In the registration phase, the user must first register with the server. Assume that the new user is granted registration only from some certain servers. The steps of the registration phase are as follows.
1) We allow the new user to choose a login password freely. The user delivers the to the SA in a secure manner. The SA then computes the user identity that satisfies
Without the key , no one can compute the . 2) In this step, SA adds the training pattern of the new user to reconstruct the network. The network architecture consists of three layers: the input layer, the hidden layer and the output layer. The input units are the password characters and the value . The password characters can be an English word or a numeral. In addition, the value is related to the expected output. The output represents the serviceable servers. If the system has servers, the number of output units is . The training pattern includes the user's password, and the expected output value. If the user receives the privilege of service from , the th unit of the expected output value denotes one. For example, a system has six servers and a new user can login to and . The input is shown in Fig. 2 . The " " is the new user's password. The value is 17, which is the binary number for the expected output 010 001. Table I , each input character is mapped into a value that ranges from zero to 62. Then SA normalizes the input value that ranges from zero to one. Once the training process is completed by the SA. SA sends and to user and stores the networks weights and the secret key in each server. The network model and the details of the training steps are described in the next section. The registration phase is complete up to this point.
B. The Login Phase
In this phase, assume that a legitimate user wants to login to server . The login phase is performed using the following steps.
1) The user obtains a time sequence , which is like a timestamp. 2) Afterward, the user computes from
Then, the user delivers the , , , and to the login server .
C. The Authentication Phase
In the authentication phase, the server receives , , , and at the time . The server performs the following tasks to authenticate the user's login request.
1) The server checks the correctness of the timestamp first. If the time interval between and is greater than , the server rejects the login request. Let denote the expected legal time interval for transmission delay between the login terminal and the system servers. 3) If the previous verification holds, the server authenticates that and are valid. Then the server authenticates the service privilege granted by the server. To provide the proper service the server normalizes the password and sends these values as input to derive the output values from the neural network. The outputs obtained represent the privileges that user can receive from the allowed servers. To transfer the output value into a binary number, we can check whether holds. If the th output unit is the desired output that approaches one, the server II  THE TRAINING SET ILLUSTRATION accepts the user for login. The procedures for privilege authentication utilizing the neural network are shown in Fig. 3 . The detail on how the network works are described in the next section. In our scheme, the system does not require password nor verification tables. Each server only stores the same and fixed set of network weights and a secret key . Each login user only has one pair, and , to log in various servers in this system. Therefore, it is suitable for multiserver environment. Furthermore, our scheme validates the legitimacy of a remote login user in real time and can withstand the replay attack.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
In the investigation phase, we used the same training pattern to test the learning abilities and the performance of three neuralnetwork models. The three models are as follows:
• Backpropagation network (BPN),
• Sum-of-product network,
• Hybrid sum-of-product network. All of these three models are supervised learning models. Each model consists of three layers: the input layer, the hidden layer, and the output layer. In order to compare the differences among these three models, the working environment should be defined in advance. These three models were run on AMD K6-based PCs. The programs used on these networks were implemented in C language. We assumed the multiserver system had six servers ( ) and 100 users ( ). Each user password consisted of eight characters. The server normalized value into two login values. Therefore, the neural network architecture had ten input units in the input layer, 24 processing units in the hidden layer, and six output units in the output layer. Assume that the password of is " " and he/she is granted registration only from servers and . Therefore, the expected output values are (0,1,0,0,0,1). Before training the network, the password is normalized.
A. Normalization
The password " " is divided into characters, then according to the mapping table, as shown in Table I, Table II illustrates each user's password and the corresponding normalization results from this experiment.
B. The Architecture
In this experiment, the same training set, as shown in Table II , was used to compare the accuracy and performance of these three architectures.
The BPN is one of the most well known types of neural networks. The BPN architecture is shown in Fig. 4 . The processing units between the layers are fully connected and the input value from each unit is the sum of the previous layer's output values multiplied by a weight vector. The value of these weights is modified by the training patterns. The BPN algorithm can be found in [24] , [26] . There are 384 weights used by the BPN architecture.
The sum-of-products network architecture [21] - [23] is shown in Fig. 5 , which is an additive scheme of the BPN network [24] . Each unit is the sum of the output values from the previous layer multiplied by a weight value. For example, the ten input units have two unit combinations. We can compute the number of combinations using this equation:
, where is the number of units. In this experiment, the sum-of-product network consisted of ten input units, 24 hidden units, and six output units. Therefore, this network implies 2736 weights.
The number of interconnecting weights grows faster than the BPN network. In our password authentication scheme, the number of input units is fixed, but the number of output units increases when a server is added into the system. Therefore, if the number of servers increases, the number of interconnect weights grows rapidly. A large number of weights require more memory space and computation time. In order to improve this weakness, we propose a new hybrid sum-of-products network architecture, which is similar to that described in [22] . The hybrid sum-of-product network architecture is shown in Fig. 6 . The hidden layer connects to the output layer using the standard BPN architecture and the input layer is connected to the hidden layer using the sum-of product network architecture. With this network model, the network needs 1224 weights in the experiment.
Three types of network architecture for testing the password authentication scheme are presented. The cost and performance of these architectures will be compared. Table II shows the training pattern for the neural network. In this table, each training pattern has 16 values. The numbers 1-8 are used to normalize the password. The numbers 9-10 are the normalization values for and the last numbers [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] are expected values. In this experiment, we assumed that the system had 100 users and six servers. Each training pattern has 16 values. The training set has a total of 100 patterns. The training set is then input to train the network.
C. Training
In the training process, the weights are randomly assigned and the learning rate is 0.5. The transfer function is the Sigmoid function. The value is between zero and one. When the sum of squared error (SSE) reaches its minimum or the error has not changed, the training is stopped. Once the training is completed, the weights are stored in the neural network in each server. In addition, the system threshold is designed to have a greater limit.
D. Classification
After the training phase, the servers store the network weights and define the threshold, which is the minimum error for the all classification outputs for all legitimate users. When a user delivers his , and to login to a particular server in step 2 of the authentication phase, a wrong and was rejected first. If the pair, and , are valid, the server will input the password normalization and to compute the classification output using the neural network. Each user's classification output is shown in Table III . The output result is must strongly represent a particular server. If the output error is less than the threshold, the server accepts the login request. For example, we define the system error threshold at 0.1. When a user wants login to server , the server computes the classification result through the classification network. The classification output is [0.00,1.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.99], all units are less than the error threshold. The server then computes the binary number 010 001 and checks if the value is equal to 17. If TABLE III  THE CLASSIFICATION OUTPUT FOR ALL USERS this holds, the server accepts the login request. Otherwise, the server rejects the login request.
E. Accuracy and Performance Analysis
In this experiment, we used the same training set to test the three types of neural-network architectures. In all of these architectures, the number of input and output units are the same. The number of units in the hidden layer may be different. In these neural networks, it was difficult for the sum of squared error (SSE) algorithm to reach its minimum. The classification output approached the expected output as close as possible. A comparison of these three architectures is shown in Table IV . A smaller SSE can be obtained using the sun-of-product network. However, there are greater computation and storage costs. The hybrid sum-of-product network is more suitable for a 100-user multiserver system.
In authentication scheme accuracy, the wrong and can be checked in step 2 of the authentication phase. It is impossible to login a wrong and into a certain server. The cases in which the and are legitimate, but the login user does not have the privilege to log in certain server, the user will present a value to the login server. The server computes the classification output and checks if this value equals . The server will not grant privileges to that user for this server, although server accepted the login request. We tested 200 pairs ( ) for login. Out of 200 attempts, no classification output equaled the value . These users were not accepted for login to the server. It is very difficult to input and the output binary number equals the value . Therefore, in our scheme the error rate was nearly 0%.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the security analysis of the proposed scheme in password authentication using the neural network. There are several possible attacks in the conventional remote password authentication scheme. In the following, we discuss some key properties of the proposed scheme and examine the security of our scheme.
A. Secrecy
In our scheme, the secret key of the system and the password of the user must be kept secret. The parameters , and a large prime are published. In our scheme, the ID is a ciphertext that using the DES-like algorithm to encrypt the password. It is not feasible to obtain the password without the system key . Furthermore, a login user delivers , and to the login server in login phase. The message is ( ) and the information of PW can not be revealed by . It gets its security from the difficulty of calculating discrete logarithms [7] , [8] . Therefore, we can confirm the password secrecy.
B. Nonforgability
Assume that an intruder wants to forge a legal user password to login to a server. The intruder forges a pair ( ) and a timestamp . However, if (4) does not hold, the server will reject the login request. A legal user wants to access a nonserviceable server. The user delivers the correct ID and PW, but delivers an incorrect value . The server can resist the attack using the neural network. The server can check if the is equal to the binary number of the classification output.
C. Replay Resistance
To resist the replay attack, our scheme uses the timestamp concept. When an intruder replays a previously intercepted login message to masquerade as a legal user, he/she must pass the test in step 1 of the authentication phase. The intruder must change into a new time such that . is the timestamp given at the time the server receives the illegal login message. Once is changed, the value of also changes. However, the intruder cannot solve the valid . This is the property of nonforgability. The intruder will fail the test in the authentication phase. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against the replay attack.
The proposed scheme detects replays of the login message by testing . However, this test may occur under two conditions. The first is if is too small, the server denies legitimate authentication requests. This will result in a possible network delay or the loss of clock synchronization. The other condition is if is too large, the server cannot resist the replay attack. Thus, it is important here to choose an appropriate . One of the solutions is to use a replay detection buffer, which stores the clock synchronization. The server can change the according to the traffic load and clock synchronization. In the proposed scheme, the timestamping concept is susceptible to denial-of-service [2] at the authentication phase.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a remote password authentication scheme based on a neural network. In this scheme, the server does not store or maintain password or verification table. The server only stores the weights of the classification network. According this network, the server can authenticate the validity of the login user in real time. The main advantage of this scheme is that it is applicable to both multiuser and multiserver networks. The system users can freely choose their password and the servers are required to retain only the pair user ID and password. The user can login to various servers without repetitive registration with each server. The password authentication scheme can prevent the replay attack, the intruder cannot obtain a login password through the open network and replay the password to login to a server.
